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The role of foreign aid in promoting economic growth is a debatable issue and remains unsettled at 
both theoretical and empirical levels. Pakistan has received a substantial amount of foreign aid since its 
Independence in 1947 but little improvement has been observed in its socio-economic development. 
This study considers the question as to whether foreign aid is a blessing or a curse for Pakistan. The 
empirical analysis is based on the ARDL cointegration approach. We examine the aid-growth link at the 
aggregate and disaggregate levels for the period 1972–2006. The results show negative and insignificant 
effects of foreign aid on the growth at the aggregate as well at the disaggregate level. The findings further 
suggest that domestic investment, export growth, and inflows of foreign direct investment are important 
contributors in enhancing economic growth in Pakistan.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Foreign aid is an important source of income in developing countries and carries 
potential to play a key role in promoting economic growth.1 The traditional literature on 
economic growth emphasises the positive role of foreign aid in the process of economic 
development. Foreign aid inflow influences the process of growth by reducing the 
saving-investment gap, increasing productivity and transferring the modern technology. 
However, in the neoclassical growth framework the benefits of foreign capital inflows are 
of temporary nature.  Like many other developing countries, Pakistan has heavily relied 
on foreign borrowings to finance its economic development. This strategy increased its 
dependency on external resources. Pakistan has received around US$73.14 billion in the 
form of foreign aid from 1960 to 2002 [Anwar and Michaelowa (2006)], but the benefits 
of this aid flows have not stretched to the whole society, which means that foreign aid has 
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failed to improve the economic conditions in Pakistan. The literacy rate is still around 50 
percent and other social indicators, such as employment, health and education etc., also 
do not present an encouraging picture. Saving rates have remained low, and the trade gap 
has widened [Husain (1999)].  Foreign aid has not been utilised for development of the 
economy; rather aid has served the vested interests of influential people. During 1990s, 
the foreign loans at commercial rate of interest have exacerbated the foreign debt 
problem of the country. The overall situation depicted above cast doubts about the 
effectiveness of foreign aid as a tool for economic growth.  
The impact of foreign aid on economic development has always been a 
controversial issue.2 In 1950s, 1960s and 1970s rich countries used foreign aid to fill the 
gaps in resources, encouraging domestic investment and industrial development under the 
belief that foreign aid could help developing countries to accelerate the “takeoff” into 
self-sustained growth by generating new domestic investment [Rostow (1960) and 
Waterson (1965)]. Many economists assert that foreign capital inflow is necessary and 
sufficient condition for economic growth in developing countries. They claim that there 
exist a positive correlation between foreign aid and economic growth because it 
complements domestic resources and also supplements domestic savings to bridge 
saving-investment gap and provides additional financial resources which helps to achieve 
the short-term growth targets. Besides, it is also held that, foreign aid assists to close the 
foreign exchange gap, provide excess to modern technology and managerial skills and 
allow easier excess to world markets [see for example, Chenery and Strout (1966);  
Papanek (1973); Gulati (1975); Roemer (1989); Islam (1992) and Thirlwall (1999); 
among others]. Mosley (1980) observes a positive relationship between foreign aid and 
economic growth for UK aided countries and negative for French and Scandinavian aided 
countries. However, he concludes that aid could not improve the economic conditions in 
Bangladesh, India and countries like Korea, Malawi and Kenya.  
Another strand of literature asserts that external capital exert significant negative 
effect on the economic growth of the recipient countries. According to this view, foreign 
aid is fully consumed and substitutes rather than complements domestic resources. It is 
argued that foreign aid is used to import inappropriate technology, distorts domestic 
income distribution and encourages a bigger, inefficient and corrupt government in 
developing countries Foreign aid is also thought to displace domestic savings, which in 
turn retards investment and economic growth [Griffin and Enos (1970); Weisskoff 
(1972)].  Boone (1996) finds that aid has no effect on investment and growth—his 
estimates show that the marginal propensity to consume from foreign aid is insignificant 
and marginal propensity to investment was zero. Easterly (2001) finds no empirical 
relationship between foreign aid and economic growth and between aid and investment. 
He concludes that aid has not delivered the expected results and may create the wrong 
economic incentives. Many studies confirm negative correlation between foreign aid and 
economic growth. Negative correlation between aid and growth is the outcome of factors 
such as economic policies, government intervention, business cycle and instability of 
foreign aid flows in the recipient countries [Levy (1984)]. Singh (1985) concludes that 
state intervention in the economy generate negative impact on economic growth and 
makes the aid-growth relationship statistically insignificant.  Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
 
2See White (1992) and Addison, et al.  (2005) for a comprehensive survey.  
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find that the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth may depend on 
whether the recipient countries have been pursuing sound economic policies. Gounder 
(2001) and Lloyd, et al. (2001) find that foreign aid contributes to long-term growth in 
private consumption and policy reforms enhance the effectiveness of economic growth. 
Mavrotas (2002) finds that policies impact aid effectiveness in case of India. Lensink and 
Morrissey (2000) analyse the impact of aid uncertainty on economic growth in 
developing countries. They find that the impact of foreign aid on economic growth 
depends on the aid levels and the stability of aid flows. Pallage and Robe (2001) explain 
empirical regularities in the foreign aid flows to developing countries. They reveal that 
aid flow is a major source of income in the majority of recipient countries and aid flow is 
highly volatile and overwhelmingly pro-cyclical. This means that even if foreign aid 
helps foster economic growth, serious problems would nevertheless stem from the fact 
that aid disbursement pattern intensify volatility of developing countries’ disposable 
income which affects growth negatively.  Hansen and Tarp (2001) conclude that aid 
increases growth via capital accumulation and it does not depend on good policy. They 
note that growth regressions are sensitive to choice of control variables and choice of 
estimators and that much more theoretical work is needed before drawing policy insights.   
Pack and Pack (1994) asserts that foreign aid is fungible. They claimed that because of 
the fungibility of foreign aid, the increase in government income in the form of aid will 
be crowded-out. 
On the other hand, Cassen (1994) argues that the relationship between aid and 
growth is rather weak, and it can be either positive or negative, depending on the 
country’s absorption capacity of aid, economic and political structure and the time period 
chosen. Studies based on time series data conclude that foreign aid has been an important 
determinant of economic growth. Feyzioglu, et al. (1998) concludes that sectoral 
concessional loans are highly fungible.  
An alternate strand of literature points out that foreign economic assistance 
displaces processes of institutional maturation that is essential to promote economic 
development. Thus, foreign aid promotes aid-dependency [Friedman (1958) and Bauer 
(1971)]. Foreign assistance represents a side payment to elites in recipient countries, 
design to buy compliance in maintaining the economic and political dominance of the 
industrialised countries [Frank (1966)]. Brautigam and Knack (2004) point out that poor 
quality institutions, weak rule of law, absence of accountability, controls over 
information and high level of corruption have distorted the benefits of foreign aid in most 
African countries. Similarly, Wolfensohn the president of World Bank in 2002 observed 
that “we have learned that corruption; bad policies and weak governance will make aid 
ineffective”.  However, selective foreign aid has helped to improve per capita income and 
lower infant mortality rate in under-developed nations [Easterly (2003)]. Selective 
foreign aid means that donor nations put some conditionalities in the form of low 
inflation and budget deficit, non-interference with market prices, privatisation and 
openness to international trade [Easterly (2003)].  Svensson (1999) concludes that foreign 
aid has a positive long-term impact in democratic countries, but in countries with 
authoritarian regimes, aid has often dissipated into unproductive activities. Ranis and 
Mahmood (1992) claims that foreign aid retard a country’s ability to adhere to 
responsible economic policies. 
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The bulk of theoretical and empirical literature has so far produced inconsistent and 
elusive results regarding the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth. Empirical 
findings are also mixed with respect to the impact of foreign aid in Pakistan. For instance, 
Chishti and Hasan (1992) conclude that 28 percent of the domestic borrowings go towards 
financing the public sector non-development expenditures. Their results also indicate that 
foreign aid in the form of grants has a modest impact on public investment while loans do not 
seem to have a significant impact on public investment. Shabbir and Mahmood (1992) 
conclude that net foreign capital inflows, disbursement of grants and external loans have a 
positive impact on economic growth of Pakistan.  Ali (1993) points out that there is no 
significant relationship between inflow of foreign aid and economic growth. Khan and Rahim 
(1993) conclude that foreign aid has negative relationship with domestic savings and it has no 
significant impact on economic growth. Iqbal (1997) is of the view that foreign capital that 
flows into the public sector has strong positive impact on social and non-development 
expenditures and has little effect on development spending. He further suggests that foreign 
loans and aid are largely consumed rather than invested productively and foreign assistance 
cause a strong shift of public domestic resources from development projects to non-
development expenditures.  Khan (1997) has also pointed out that aid has a robust negative 
impact on economic growth. Similarly, Ishfaq and Ahmed (2005) conclude that foreign aid 
has not contributed favourably to GDP growth rate of Pakistan. This ineffectiveness of aid is 
attributed to diversion of aid funds to non-productive activities and inefficiency in resource 
allocation especially in the public sector. Husain (1999) argues that foreign aid exerts positive 
impact on growth if the macroeconomic policies are correct, microeconomic incentives are 
not distorted and the supporting institutions are in place. In the absence of these preconditions 
foreign aid helps to postpone the tough decisions required for prudent economic management. 
Under these circumstances, foreign aid is curse rather than blessing and should be avoided.   
These conflicting views have motivated us to reinvestigate the role of foreign aid 
in determining economic growth. This paper seeks to answer the question whether 
foreign aid is blessing or curse for Pakistan? Specifically we hypothesise that Pakistan 
should concentrate on those external resources that are stable, sustainable and are largely 
within the policy control of the authorities, rather than continue to depend on those 
resources which are more volatile, less stable and controlled by the external policy-
makers.  We formulate an empirical model to test this hypothesis for Pakistan over the 
period 1972-2006. The estimation is carried out using autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) cointegration technique. This study differs significantly from earlier studies for 
Pakistan in three respects. First, we analyse the impact of foreign aid on economic 
growth at aggregate as well as disaggregate level by extending neo-classical production 
function. Second, the study determines the relative importance of alternative external 
financing resources such as exports growth and foreign direct investment. Third, the 
study uses most recent econometric techniques for estimation and covers the period from 
1972 to 2006 and, finally the study extends the body of literature on aid-growth linkages.  
The remainder of the study is organised as follows: Section 2 overviews the 
inflows of foreign capital in developing countries.  The brief review of foreign aid 
inflows in Pakistan is given in this section. Section 3 discusses the model, methodology 
and data. Interpretation of empirical findings is given in Section 4, while concluding 
remarks along with policy implications are given in the final section. 
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2.  FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOWS TO DEVELOPING  
COUNTRIES: AN OVERVIEW 
Foreign aid and foreign private investment are the two main sources of capital 
inflows in developing countries. Foreign aid could be categorised into grants and 
relatively low interest rate loans, while the foreign private investment can be categorised 
into foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and foreign direct investment (FDI). The pattern 
and trend of such foreign inflows into developing countries have significantly changed 
during the past three decades. Grants-type aid to developing countries increased from 
US$ 1.9 billion in 1970 to US$ 52.6 billion in 2005. This increase is, however, modest 
when compared with the expansion in FDI and FPI (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Inflows of Foreign Capital in Developing Countries (US$ Billion) 
Year FDI FPI Grants * 
1970 2.2 0.0 1.9 
1980 4.4 0.0 13.1 
1990 24.1 2.8 28.2 
1998 170.9 15.6 27.1 
1999 192.0 27.6 26.4 
2000 168.8 14.1 28.7 
2002 160.3 5.9 32.5 
2003 161.6 25.2 43.7 
2004 211.4 37.6 50.3 
2005 237.5 61.4 52.6 
Source: Global Development Finance (2000, 2006). * Indicate net flow of grants excluding technical cooperation. 
 
FDI flows increased from US$ 2.2 billion in 1970 to US$ 237.5 in 2005. Similarly, 
FPI which was US$ 2.8 billion in 1990 reached to US$ 61.4 billion in 2005, while aid in 
the form of grants increased from US$ 1.9 billion in 1970 to US$ 52.6 billion in 2005. 
Foreign aid has been an important source of capital inflows for developing 
countries during 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. After the end of cold war, the strategic 
importance of foreign aid has declined in 1990s, although the number of donor agencies 
has increased from 7 to 50 from 1960 to 1990.  There is no doubt that foreign aid helps to 
promote economic growth and infrastructure of recipient countries, particularly, at the 
time of natural disasters. However, the literature suggests that the impact of foreign aid 
on economic development is rather limited because foreign aid is usually directed 
towards military and political fields instead of socio-economic fields [Le and Ataullah 
(2002)]. On the other hand, the conditionalities imposed by the donor agencies may 
constrain the autonomous policies the recipient countries may like to pursue. Many 
empirical studies suggest that foreign aid has not contributed profoundly to the economic 
growth and development of recipient countries and it has tendency towards increasing 
inequalities among different groups [Rana and Dowling (1990) and Griffin (1991)].  
Moreover, foreign aid hurts rather than helps the poor. It goes to their rulers whose 
spending policies are determined by their own personal and political interests, among 
which the position of the poor has very low priority [Lappe`, et al. (1980) and Bauer 
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(1981)]. Similarly, Hayter and Watson (1985) notes that the governments of the rich 
countries claims that they are providing ‘aid’ to help the Third World to escape from the 
underdevelopment and poverty but much of this aid fails to alleviate poverty. 
In contrast, the British Department for International Development (2000) argues 
that development assistance could contribute to poverty reduction in countries pursuing 
sound macroeconomic policies. Canadian International Development Agency (2002) 
cites World Bank researchers’ compelling evidence that good governance and sound 
policy environment are the most important determinants of aid effectiveness.  
Moreover, the increasing tendency towards providing loans instead of grants and 
tying aid had left many Third World countries in debt burden cycle. Given the unequal 
effects of foreign aid and limited control over the quantity of aid received, policymakers 
in LDCs are increasingly looking for alternate sources of foreign capital including foreign 
direct investment and portfolio investment. 
 
2.1.  History of Foreign Aid in Pakistan 
Foreign aid began to flow into Pakistan soon after the independence. During 1950s 
the flows of aid was very small. But in 1960s and 1970s, foreign aid remained an important 
source of capital for Pakistan. Pakistan was one of the largest aid recipient countries in Asia 
during this period, (see Table 2). For example, Pakistan got foreign aid around 6.6 percent 
of the GNP in 1960. The increase in aid was concomitant with the increase in the level of 
private investment, which rose from 42.55 percent of total investment in 1959-60 to 53.3 
percent of the total investment in 1969-70 [Malik, et al. (1994)]. During this period, huge 
investment in the physical infrastructure, power, and irrigation related projects was made 
with the help of foreign aid which helped to lay down economic foundation of the country. 
Mega projects such as Terbala and Mangla dams were constructed during this period. The 
inflows of aid picked up momentum in the early 1970s and remained around 4.2 percent of 
the GNP. In 1974-75, the inflow of foreign aid to Pakistan reached US$ 1.00 billion mark, 
and the proportion of aid to GNP by then had touched 5.5 percent. Because of the huge 
inflow of foreign aid, the government launched public investment programmes such as 
roads, electric power, increasing social services, and projects like Indus Super Highway and 
Pakistan Steel Mills. 
The increase in aid witnessed in the mid-1970s did not continue for the coming 
years. Gross disbursements of aid fell in 1977-78 and 1978-79 as the United States 
curtailed aid to Pakistan because of its nuclear policy [Malik, et al. (1994)].   However, 
during 1980s Pakistan again received a large amount of foreign aid (4.6 percent of GNP) 
because of its front-line role in the America-Soviet Union conflict over Afghanistan. The 
foreign inflows reached to US$2.0 billion mark per annum by the mid-1980s which 
enhanced the credit worthiness of Pakistan [Le and Ataullah (2002); Husain (1999)]. 
Pakistan and United States signed a six year agreement in 1985 according to which 
United States was to provide US$ 4.02 billion in terms of loans and grants over six-year 
period beginning September 1987. Of US$ 4.02 billions, 57 percent amount was 
allocated as economic aid and the remaining in the form of military aid. After signing this 
agreement, the gross disbursement of aid increased to US$1.8 billion in 1987-88.  The 
composition of aid over the years has changed from grants and grants-type assistance to 
loans on difficult terms. 
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Table 2 
Foreign Aid to Pakistan and Other Asian Countries 
Aid as Percentage of GNP  
Country 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Pakistan 6.6 4.2 4.6 2.7 0.97 2.8 3.08 1.32 1.52 1.54 
India 2.31 1.37 1.2 0.45 0.32 0.36 0.29 0.15 0.1 0.22 
Bangladesh – 5.21* 7.31 6.82 2.39 2.11 1.83 2.55 2.37 2.09 
Sri Lanka 0.71 2.18 9.68 9.26 1.8 2.02 2.11 3.72 2.7 5.13 
Nepal 1.58 2.71 8.17 11.6 7.03 7.02 6.57 7.9 6.37 5.77 
Hong Kong 0.5 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Singapore –0.05 1.5 0.12 –0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 – 
Thailand 1.6 1.04 1.3 0.94 0.58 0.25 0.24 –0.68 0.02 –0.1 
 Aid Per Capita (Current US Dollar) 
Pakistan 5.5 6.94 14.27 10.43 5.01 13.73 14.69 7.15 9.36 10.7 
India 1.7 1.51 3.18 1.65 1.44 1.65 1.37 0.85 0.64 1.58 
Bangladesh – 0.32** 15.66 20.11 9.06 7.79 6.78 10.2 10.15 9.31 
Sri Lanka 1.05 3.93 26.24 42.8 14.24 16.69 18.08 35.16 26.71 60.6 
Nepal 0.81 1.93 10.55 22.12 12.85 15.64 14.15 17.77 16.08 15.77 
Hong Kong 1.9 0.36 2.15 6.69 0.65 0.53 0.58 0.74 1.01 – 
Singapore –0.2 13.81 5.75 –1.02 0.27 0.21 1.72 1.69 2.16 – 
Thailand 1.61 2.04 9.02 14.56 11.36 4.53 4.7 –15.18 0.41 –2.66 
Source: http://devdata.worldbank.org/query. *, ** Indicate 1977 and 1971 respectively. 
 
In 1990, the United States announced that it would not enter into any more aid 
agreement with Pakistan and would wind up its aid related projects at the end of 1993. 
This shift in US policy led to considerable adverse change in aid receipts to Pakistan. The 
major reasons for changes in United States contributions were the passage of the Pressler 
Amendment and the Brown Amendment in the aid authorisation bills by the United 
States Senate in 1985 and 1995 respectively.  Because of the Pressler Amendment US aid 
disbursement to Pakistan which was US$ 452 million in 1989, fell in early 1990s to touch 
rock bottom at only US$ 5.4 million in 1998 [Anwar and Michaelowa (2006)]. In 1993-
94, aid from consortium and non-consortium sources declined considerably. In 1998, 
when Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, further international aid-sanctions, particularly by 
the US government, were imposed on Pakistan. As a consequence, during 1998-2001, 
both bilateral and multilateral aid declined significantly.  
However, after the 9/11 things changed dramatically. When Pakistan joined the 
‘War against Terrorism’, the volume of aid increased by 7 times and reached US$ 776.5 
million. The US launched another US$ 3 billion five-year economic assistant package for 
Pakistan in June 2003. Other donor countries also sanctioned aid and rescheduled 
Pakistan’s external debts. This situation reflects how the flow of foreign aid to Pakistan 
has always been  subject to conditionalities, and vulnerable to geopolitical and strategic 
interests of the donors particularly, Unites States. Figure 1 clearly depicts the picture of 
the composition and structure of foreign aid received by Pakistan during the period 1956–
2005.  
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Fig.1.  Source-wise Disbursement of Foreign Aid to Pakistan from 1956-57 to 2004-05 
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Figures 1 indicates that from 1956-57 to 2004-05, the share of project aid averaged 
60 percent of the total aid, followed by the share of balance of payments support, which 
is 15 percent. The shares of non-food and food aid have been 10 percent and 12 percent 
respectively. The share of foreign aid for relief was only 3 percent during the period. 
The project/non-project aid and food/non-food aid are very important components 
of the total foreign aid because project aid directly adds to the productive capacity of the 
aid recipient country. Contrarily, large proportion of non-project aid adds to the debt 
burden of aid receiving country. Figure 2 shows the trend of project and non-project aid 
inflows to Pakistan since 1990-91. The project aid depicts a declining trend during the 
period 1990-91 to 2005-06, whereas from 2002-03 non-project aid again had been 
following an increasing trend. Resultantly, total aid increased from US$ 1270 in 1996-97 
to US$ 2316 million in 2005-06. 
 
Fig. 2. Trends of Project, Non-project and Total Aid.  From 1990-91 to 2005-06 
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The sectoral distribution of foreign private loans, for the period 1990-2005 is 
shown in Table 3 and Figure 3. The share of, textiles sector in total foreign private loans 
is almost 15 percent, Petroleum refining 14 percent, Pakistan International Air Line (PIA) 
26 percent and transport 23 percent.  
During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, Pakistan was among the largest aid recipient 
countries. But the benefits of this aid could not stretch to the whole society. The aim of 
Pakistan’s five-year Plans for the period 1965-85 was elimination of dependence on 
foreign assistance [Le and Ataullah (2002)]. But there had been a significant increase in 
foreign economic assistance since then. This increase in foreign aid could not help in the 
socio-economic uplift. For example, during the 1960s and 1970s when Pakistan was the 
largest aid receiving country among Asian countries, the average percentage of 
population living under the poverty line declined marginally from 43 percent to 39 
percent.  Social services and human sector development have remained neglected and the 
social indicators have worsened, leaving Pakistan at par with some of the poorest African 
countries. Pakistan ranks 120th in the human development index constructed by UNDP 
[Husain (1999)]. Physical infrastructure such as irrigation, electricity, roads and 
highways, telecommunications, railways, and other capital assets have been poorly 
maintained and have neither been replaced, nor expanded to keep up with the growing 
demand [Husain (1999)]. Empirical studies suggest that aid has not exerted any 
significant effect on economic growth. Khan (1997) finds negative causal effect of aid on 
economic growth, while Ishfaq and Ahmed (2005) conclude that economic growth of 
Pakistan has remained independent of foreign aid. 
The huge inflows of foreign aid to Pakistan could not be utilised for the 
development purposes. Rather, aid has served the vested interest of a small influential 
group of the society and the political elite in the government circle and has delayed the 
day of reckoning. An increase in foreign aid in the form of loans during the 1990s has 
exacerbated the foreign debt problem in the country. 
Figure 4: Economic Group-wise Disbursement of Foreign Private Loans Since 1990-91
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Fig. 3.  Economic Group-wise Disbursement of Foreign Private Loans Since 1990-91 
Table 3 
Economic Group-wise Disbursement of Foreign Private Loans since 1990-91 (in Million US$) 
Economic Group FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 
Power – – – 4.2 350.2 367.8 461.0 687.3 121.1 21.1 48.0 70.8 86.5 37.6 18.3 
Cement 7.4 – 1.1 – 18.8 130.1 11.8 – – 31.5 53.0 5.6 – 23.2 – 
Fertiliser – 2.0 153.6 1.8 – – 9.8 5.0 37.2 43.5 40.5 3.5 14.7 – – 
Chemicals – 18.6 9.3 6.2 13.0 50.7 52.0 21.4 1.0 18.6 – 6.8 – 45.9 – 
Textiles 111.6 291.2 293.5 421.4 150.5 142.9 72.6 23.9 0.8 8.1 15.6 2.9 30.0 5.2 – 
Financial Business 9.0 – 60.0 21.3 28.0 – – – 6.0 – 11.5 – – – – 
Oil and Gas Explorations – 1.1 – – – – – – – – – – – – – 
Paper and Pulp – – 0.3 25.8 – 32.4 7.5 1.8 – 6.7 – 36.5 – – – 
Petroleum Refining – 0.9 – – – – 17.9 20.3 – – – – – – – 
Communications – – – – – – – 21.1 16.1 6.6 12.8 34.0 – 17.0 – 
Transport 13.0 245.0 139.0 139.9 – – – – – 117.0 – – 219.0 374.0 – 
PIA 13.0 245.0 139.0 124.0 342.0 – – – – – 117.0 – 219.0 374.0 – 
Sugar 5.0 – – 5.7 3.3 9.8 2.7 – – – – – – – – 
Construction – – 2.7 – 4.1 – – – – – – – – – – 
Others 12.1 3.7 0.9 6.7 44.0 24.8 39.4 15.2 18.1 24.4 21.5 13.0 – – 1.8 
Total 158.1 562.5 660.4 633.0 953.9 758.5 674.7 796.0 194.3 284.0 191.4 184.6 350.0 503.0 20.1 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan (Handbook for Pakistan’s Economy 2005).  FY represents Fiscal Year.  
Foreign Aid—Blessing or Curse 
 
225
3. MODEL, METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The rationale that foreign aid increases economic growth is based on Chenery and 
Strout’s Dual Gap Model. Chenery and Strout (1966) claimed that foreign aid promotes 
economic growth by contributing to domestic savings as well as foreign exchange availability 
and helping to close the saving-investment and export-import gaps. In two-gap model, 
investment is the cornerstone of growth and requires imported capital goods [Ali and Isse 
(2005)]. However, developing countries generally face two fundamental financial gaps. The 
first gap is between the investment and domestic savings, while the second gap is between 
imports and foreign exchange earnings [Easterly (2003)] The developing countries cannot 
overcome the shortage of savings and foreign exchange earning on their own due to their 
limited resources however, foreign aid and other financial flows can fill these gaps and 
contribute to achieving target growth rates. In two-gap model the contribution of foreign aid is 
to finance investment including imports of capital goods. Exports growth is also important as 
it generates foreign exchange to finance imports.  
Following Husain (1992) we divide external resources in to two categories. First, 
the resources which have stable, sustainable and positive effect on economic growth and 
are within the policy control of the domestic authorities. These include export of goods 
and services (X) and foreign direct investment (FDI). Second, foreign aid, external 
borrowings and workers remittances are found to be volatile, less stable and under the 
control of external policymakers and their contributions to economic growth are 
questionable. The external environment influence exports demand and FDI supply, but 
despite short-term fluctuations these resources remains stable and are relatively more 
influenced by the domestic policy variables. Hence, preference may be given to these 
resources rather than foreign aid, worker remittances and external borrowings to finance 
long-term development [Husain (1992)].   
Based on the above arguments we formulate the link between economic growth 
and foreign aid following pure production function theory. Assume that real gross 
domestic product (GDP) of Pakistan is:  
 )(qFY =  … … … … … … … … (1) 
Where Y is the real GDP, F is the transformation rule associating Y and q, q is the vector 
of explanatory inputs. Assuming a multiplicative aid-trade-augmented production 
function and that {capital (K), labour (L), foreign aid (A) and exports (X)} ∈q, Equation 
(1) becomes [Amavilah (1998)]: 
 
ueXALKY γδβαΘ=  … … … … … … (2) 
Where u is the normally distributed random error term.  The inclusion of exports in the 
conventional production function may be justified on two grounds. First, exports allow 
countries to specialise in the production of such commodities in which they have 
comparative advantage. Export sector is assumed to be more competitive and efficient 
than other sectors. Exports growth facilitates the exploitation of scale economies, allows 
for increased capacity utilisation and encourages efficiency through specialisation in 
accordance with the principles of comparative advantage. Second, the export sector is 
assumed to generate positive externalities, such as relaxing foreign exchange constraints 
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and the introduction of technology and knowledge. It is also assumed that with the given 
level of capital and labour, the larger the size of the export sector, the larger the gross 
value of production [Rana and Dowling (1990)]. Edwards (1998) points out that exports 
affect economic growth positively through increases in total factor productivity. The 
inclusion of foreign aid in the conventional production function can also be found in 
Tyler (1981), Feder (1982), Gounder (2001), Amavilah (1998) and Burke, et al. (2006) 
among others. 
Following Burke, et al. (2006) and Ahmed and Hamdani (2003) we break total 
capital stock (K) into domestic capital (Kd) and foreign capital (Kf) i.e., K = Kd + Kf.  
Now Equation (2) becomes: 
u
fd eXALKKY
γδβϕαΘ=  … … … … … … (3) 
The log-linear form of Equation (3) is given by: 
uLnXLnALnLLnKLnKLnLnY fd +λ+δ+β+φ+α+Θ=  … … (4) 
Since the data for domestic capital stock and foreign capital stock are not available, 
therefore we use domestic investment as a share of GDP (INVY), foreign investment to GDP 
(FDIY) as proxy for the domestic capital and foreign capital. Furthermore, we use foreign aid 
as a share of GDP (AIDY) to control for the effect of price changes over time. Edwards and 
Tabellini (1990) and Fosu (2001) points out that political instability is expected to exert 
negative impacts on growth. To account for political instability we included a dummy variable 
(D) taking value one for the period 1979-1985 and 1999-2002 and zero otherwise. Equation 
(4) now takes the following form:3  
tttttttt uDXLAIDYFDIYINVYY +η+η+η+η+η+η+η= 6543210 … (5a) 
Equation (5a) represents the neoclassical growth model expanded to include 
exports and non-export sectors and is similar to that of Gounder (2001) and Burke, et al. 
(2006). The production function includes share of total investment to GDP (INVY) to 
measures its impact on economic growth because investment is one of the principal 
determinants of growth [Lensink and Morrissey (2000)]. Thus, investment is included in 
the model to capture its affects on growth through the level of efficiency.  Exports and 
FDI variables are also included in the model to measure the degree of trade and financial 
openness. It can be argued that trade and financial openness is expected to improve 
resource allocation and accelerate economic growth.4  
To examine the impact of various forms of foreign aid on economic growth, the 
model incorporates project aid (PAIDY) and non-project aid (NAIDY) in the following 
specification form: 
   ttttttttt vDXLFDIYNAIDYPAIDYINVYY +β+β+β+β+β+β+β+β= 76543210  (5b) 
Where Y is the real GDP, INVY the domestic investment as proportion of GDP, PAIDY 
the project aid as a share of GDP, NAIDY the non-project aid as share of GDP, FDIY the 
 
3For our own convenience we eliminate “Ln” term. 
4Other variables such as portfolio investment, worker remittances etc. may not be considered because 
of the small sample size. 
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net foreign direct investment as share of GDP, L the labour force, X the real value of 
exports and vt the error term. All the variables are expressed in logarithmic form. 
This study employs Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) methodology 
advanced by Pesaran, et al. (2001). The main advantage of this methodology is that it 
allows testing for the existence of cointegration irrespective of whether the variables are   
I (0) or I (1). This approach is more appropriate than the Johansen-Juselius multivariate 
approach to cointegration when the sample size is small [Pesaran, et al. (2001)]. The 
estimation procedure involves two steps. First, long-run relationship between the 
variables under consideration is tested by computing F-statistics. If the evidence of long-
run relationship is found then at the second stage the short-run and long-run parameters 
are estimated using autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) method. The final equation is 
selected based on the acceptability of various diagnostics.  
The study is based on annual data covering the period 1972-2006. The data are 
collected from different sources. GDP, foreign aid, project aid, non-project aid (i.e., sum 
of non-food, food, balance of payments, relief and earthquake rehabilitation assistance), 
ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP, and exports are taken from the State Bank of 
Pakistan (2005) and Pakistan Economic Survey (various issues). Data on labour force is 
from Asian Development Bank─Key Indicators (various issues). The data on consumer 
price index (CPI) is from International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD-ROM (2007). All 
the flow variables (INV, AID, FDI) are measured as a ratio of GDP to control for the 
effect of price changes over time.5 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The cointegration test based on the ARDL procedure is employed by estimating 
Equation(s) (5a and 5b) for Pakistan using annual data over the period 1972-2006.6 The 
number of lags on the first-differenced variables is selected using Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC). Initially, we set 3 lags for the VAR and tested down using general-to-
specific methodology. The final lag is selected when the estimated equation(s) satisfy all 
the diagnostic checks including CUSUMSQ test of stability. On the basis of this criterion, 
two lags were selected to carry out ARDL cointegration test. The results of the 
cointegration test are reported in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Results of ARDL Cointegration Test 
Type of Aid Variable Included 
Test 
Statistic 
Optimal 
Lags Decisions 
Total Aid ),,,,,|( DXLAIDYINVYFDIYYF ttttt  6.35 2 Coinegration 
Project Aid and 
Non- project Aid 
),,,,,|( DXLNAIDYPAIDYINVYFDIYYF tttttt  3.76 2 Cointegration 
Project Aid ),,,,,|( DXLPAIDYINVYFDIYYF ttttt  12.20 2 Cointegration 
Non-project Aid ),,,,,|( DXLNAIDYINVYFDIYYF ttttt  6.42 2 Cointegration 
Note: The critical values are taken from Pesaran, et al.  (2001). 
 
 
5All the data used in this study is available from the authors and can be obtained upon request. 
6Only one limitation of ARDL method is that this technique is based on single-equation approach. 
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It is apparent from Table 4 that for each type of aid the bound cointegration test 
rejects the null of no cointegration because the computed F-statistic is much greater than 
the upper bound of the tabulated F-statistic. After finding the evidence of cointegration 
between the variables specified in equation(s) (5a and 5b), we have estimated the long-
run and short-run relationships using Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach. 
Table 5 reports the long-run and short-run estimates for various types of aid-growth 
nexus. The estimated ARDL equations pass all the diagnostic tests including the CUSUM 
and CUSUMSQ tests of stability.7 Overall, ARDL equations have a very high adjusted 
2R , F-statistics are significant and no estimation problem exists as suggested by 
Lagrange Multiplier test (LM), functional form (FF), normality (NO) and 
heteroscedasticity (Het) statistics. A more detailed interpretation of results is given 
below: 
 
(A)  Real Output and Aggregate Foreign Aid  
The estimation of the equation with total aid (Table 5 case A) suggests that in the 
long-run foreign direct investment to GDP (FDIY), total investment to GDP (INVY), 
labour force (L) and real value of exports exert positive and significant impact on real 
GDP. The coefficient of foreign aid to GDP (AIDY) is insignificant with negative 
coefficient in the long-run as well as in the short-run. The negative and insignificant 
impact of foreign aid on output suggests that economic growth is independent of foreign 
aid in case of Pakistan. This raises many serious questions regarding its justification. The 
reason could be that in most developing countries including Pakistan foreign aid is 
fungible and is diverted to public consumption [Feyzioglu, et al. (1998)].  Another reason 
may be that foreign aid is channeled through the public sector and is utilised to finance 
non-development expenditures. Moreover, when foreign capital inflows into the public 
sector are increased, some resources are diverted from development projects to non-
development projects. This diversion of resources may offset of positive impact of 
foreign aid on growth. This result suggests that the economic policies regarding aid 
utilisation are not appropriate or perhaps aid inflows have distorted macroeconomic 
incentives in Pakistan.  
The results show that foreign direct investment and exports, domestic investment 
and labour force are the main determinants of real output in the long-run.  The coefficient 
of the dummy variable (D), introduced to account for political instability, is negative and 
significant both in the long-run and short-run indicating that political instability adversely 
influenced economic growth.8  
 
7The results are available from the authors. 
8In Pakistan there are some misperceptions that the economic growth remains always high under the 
military regimes than that of democratic governments. These sentiments and thinking are very dangerous. It is 
true that the growth is reported to be higher under military governments. It is not a very plausible criterion to 
judge economic growth and performance of the governments. However, higher growth rate is meaningless when 
other micro and macroeconomic indicator are not influenced the economy positively [Bilquees (2004)]. The 
actual position in Pakistan is that the higher growth rate, poverty and unemployment are moving in the same 
directions not only in the democratic governments but also in the military regimes.  Furthermore, during the 
military rule either in 1977 or in 1999 some international developments cause higher growth rates. However, 
saving to GDP ratio, domestic investment to GDP ratio remains low despite the inflows of reasonable foreign 
assistance for being front line state in the War against Russia and War against terrorism [for further detail see, 
Khan and Khan (2007)]. 
Table 5 
Long-run and Short-run Estimates of Real Output and Foreign Aid 
A.  Real Output and Total Foreign Aid 
 
Real Output with Total Aid: ARDL (1, 0, 2, 0, 2, 1)  Based AIC 
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Table 5—(Continued) 
B. Real Output, Project Aid and Non-project Aid : ARDL (2, 2, 0, 0, 1, 2, 1) Based on AIC 
 
73.0)1(22.5)2(25.0)1(22.2)1(
002.03.4986)21,11(99.0
)46.4()44.2()80.0()80.2()00.3()30.3()15.1(
02.008.002.049.046.043.0002.0
)12.2()68.1()39.0()16.2()21.0()00.3()53.1()62.1(
005.0008.010.004.0004.005.034.032.0
2222
*2
******
1211
*****
2121
=−=−=−=−
===
−−−
−++++−−
−−
−+−++++=
−−−−
−−−−
χχχχ HetNOFFLM
RSSFR
DXXLLLNAIDY
NAIDYPAIDYINVYFDIYFDIYFDIYYYY
ttttttt
ttttttttt
 
Long-run Estimates 
******** )31.4()30.7()10.34()08.4()78.1()39.0()09.3(
05.024.018.102.002.022.020.0
−−−
−++−+−= tttttttt DXLNAIDYPAIDYINVYFDIYY
 
 
Error-Correction Representation 
***
11
******
11
)54.6()45.4()80.0()80.2(
44.002.002.049.0
)30.3()12.2()68.1()39.0()16.2()00.3()53.1(
45.0005.0009.010.004.005.024.0
−−−
−∆−∆+∆−
−−−−−
∆−∆−∆+∆−∆−∆+∆−=∆
−−
−−
tttt
tttttttt
ECDXL
LNAIDYPAIDYINVYFDIYFDIYYY
 
           71.02 =R     F-stat = 9.24        002.0=RSS               DW-stat = 2.32 
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Table 5—(Continued) 
C. Real Output and Project Aid: ARDL (1, 0, 1, 0, 2, 0) Based on AIC 
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           66.02 =R    F-stat = 10.31        003.0=RSS               DW-stat = 2.60 
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Table 5—(Continued) 
D. Real Output and Non-project Aid: ARDL (1, 0, 2, 0, 2, 1) Based on AIC 
 
 
13.3)1(61.1)2(62.0)1(68.3)1(
003.08.6683)21,11(99.0
)41.3()16.4()20.2()04.2()96.1()76.0()01.3()10.1()94.2()68.11(
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           71.02 =R       F-stat = 11.30        002.0=RSS       DW-stat = 2.37 
Note: t-values are given in parentheses.  *, ** and *** indicate significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
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In short-run the coefficient of domestic investment is negative and insignificant. 
Given the dominant share of public investment in total investment, the inefficient and 
non-productive nature of public investment might have contributed to the overall 
negative impact of total investment on growth [Ghani and Din (2006)]. Moreover, 
political instability may also affect investment growth through the decline in total factor 
productivity [Gounder (2001)]. The over all contribution of labour force (∆L) is negative 
and significant in the short-run. This may be due to the higher share of non-productive 
labour in total labour force. Another explanation for the negative coefficient on ∆L could 
be the presence of low quality and unskilled labour force.  Brain drain could be yet 
another reason of the negative effect of labour force.  
The inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and exports exert positive and 
significant impact on economic growth in long-run as well as short-run. This implies that 
instead of relying on foreign aid preference be given to attract FDI and boost exports. 
Both the FDI and exports are linked to capacity utilisation, research and development 
(R&D), increased market access and technological spillover. These benefits are expected 
to be more stable than the temporary benefits of foreign aid.  Since the magnitude of 
exports is relatively larger than the magnitude of the FDI. Therefore, the authorities have 
paid much attention on the export growth and than on creating conducive environment 
for inflows of FDI.  Finally, the adjustment coefficient possesses expected negative sign 
and is highly significant. This indicates that 41 percent of the previous period deviations 
are eliminated in the current period. 
 
(B)  Real Output, Project Aid and Non-project Aid 
The results with project aid and non-project aid  (Table 5 case B) show that 
project aid exerts positive and non-project aid exerts negative and significant impact 
on real output both in the long-run and short-run. However, the magnitude of both 
the variables is very small and negligible. This implies that project and non-project 
components of foreign aid may not effectively promote economic growth. The 
possible reason could be that the aid flows are in practiced translated into 
government consumption.9  
The other variables such as labour, FDI and exports play significant role in 
enhancing real output in long-run as well as short-run. However, the overall impact of 
labour force growth in the short-run is negative and significant. The coefficient of total 
investment share is insignificant in both the long-run and short-run. Among exports and 
FDI, the relative impact of real exports is larger than FDI in the long-run. These results 
confirm the hypothesis that exports and FDI are the main external sources of growth 
rather than foreign aid.  The dummy variable, introduced to capture political instability, is 
also negative and significant indicating the adverse effect on output both in the long-run 
and short-run. The error-correction term is negative and significant, indicates that about 
34 percent of the previous period’s deviations in real output is eliminated in the current 
period to keep real GDP at steady state level. 
 
9This could be possible because due to the weak accountability non-project aid is not utilised as 
intended.  
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(C)  Real Output and Project Aid  
Table 5 (case C) indicates that the relationship between project aid and real output 
is negative and insignificant both in the long-run and short-run. This implies that in 
Pakistan project aid is fungible. The amounts of money granted for a particular project by 
the donors are transferred to finance social and other non-development expenditures.10 
Our result confirms the earlier findings by Iqbal (1997) that foreign capital inflows have 
negative impact on development expenditure. This strengthens the idea that some 
resources are transferred from development projects to non-development expenditures 
when foreign aid is increased. Hence, project aid exerts negative and insignificant impact 
on domestic productivity. Our results also confirm the results obtained by Chishti and 
Hasan (1992) that in case of Pakistan the project aid money is fungible and this may have 
been channeled to finance government consumption.   
In long-run labour force, domestic investment, FDI and real exports exert positive 
and significant impact on real output. In short-run the external financial resources such as 
FDI and exports exerts positive and significant impact on domestic productivity.  
Domestic investment is insignificant while labour force exerts negative and significant 
impact on growth.11  The relative effect of exports is larger than that of FDI. The findings 
imply that to reduce dependence on the foreign aid, the government may concentrate on 
boosting the exports sector and create enabling environment to attract foreign investment.  
The error-correction term is again negative and highly significant. The coefficient on the 
term indicates that around 41 percent of the past deviations are eliminated in the current 
period. 
 
(D)  Real Output and Non-project Aid  
Table 5 (case D) suggest that non-project aid is significant and negatively related 
to real output in both the long-run and short-run. This finding suggests that non-project 
aid failed to produce any significant impact on economic growth. The size of the 
coefficient of non-project aid is very small indicating negligible effect on growth in the 
long-run and short-run. The reason could be the use of non-project aid to finance 
government consumption; therefore it does not contribute to growth. Other variables are 
significant and possess expected positive coefficients in the long-run. In the short-run, 
FDI and exports are positively correlated to growth, while domestic investment remains 
insignificant and labour force influences growth negatively. A positive coefficient of FDI 
and exports supports the argument that to reduce aid dependency on export sector and 
FDI may need special attention. The coefficient of dummy variable, introduced to 
account for political instability, is negative and significant indicating negative impact of 
political instability on growth in the long-run and short-run. The error-correction term is 
–0.43 and statistically significant which indicates that 43 percent of the past deviations 
are corrected in the current period.  
Overall, the impact of foreign aid at aggregate and disaggregate level is negative 
and insignificant. These results support the hypothesis that aid is fungible in case of 
Pakistan and growth is independent of foreign aid. Our results confirms the view 
 
10Iqbal (1997) argued that over-time development expenditure as percentage of total expenditure was 
reduced from 38.3 percent in 1975-76 to 18.2 percent in 1995-96 in Pakistan. 
11Explanation of negative effect is given in case A. 
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expressed by Husain (2005) that net flows as percentage of gross national income have 
gradually declined from 4.3 percent in 1970 to 1.5 percent in 2003 and net transfers from 
3.6 percent to 0.7 percent. The deduction from this evidence is quite obvious—Pakistan’s 
dependence on foreign aid is so low and insignificant that it does not make much of a 
difference to our national economy. 
Generally, there may be several reasons that undermine the impact of foreign aid 
on growth. For example, the projects funded by foreign donors may impose conditions 
including purchase of equipment, services and technical expertise from them. 
Consequently, a huge amount of money is drained out in the form of salaries and other 
payments. Moreover, foreign contractors are paid kickbacks on foreign added projects 
which encourage and promote the culture of corruption, weaken state institutions and 
increase the costs of projects. Alesina and Weder (2002) points out that foreign aid over-
time increases government corruption. The evidence of this study is not much puzzling 
because many studies conclude that foreign aid exerts negative impact on growth [for 
example Gounder (2001); Burke, et al. (2006); Chishti and Hasan (1992); Khan (1997) 
and Ishfaq and Ahmed (2005)]. The findings of the study imply that foreign aid does not 
improve economic conditions. One reason could be poor governance. Many studies point 
out that foreign aid is extended for “strategic” reasons rather than real needs of a 
country.12 Besides, foreign aid is highly volatile and its flows depend on the political ties 
between recipient and donor countries. So if the impact of foreign aid on growth is 
ambiguous or unpredictable, this should not be surprising.     
Foreign direct investment and exports exerts positive and significant impact on 
growth. The positive and significant impact of exports on real output supports the 
argument that export sector is an engine of growth.  Though FDI also exerts positive and 
significant impact on real output, however, the magnitude of exports is larger than that of 
FDI. These results demands for the expansion of export sector and encouragement of FDI 
inflows to reduce aid dependency. Finally, we conclude that domestic investment, labour, 
exports and FDI are important and significant contributors to economic growth as 
compared to foreign aid. These results are consistent with the earlier findings by Husain 
and Jun (1992) that exports performance contributed more in economic growth than aid.  
This does not mean that foreign aid has no contribution in the economic 
development of Pakistan. During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s foreign aid helped in laying 
down the physical infrastructure, which is pre-requisite for future economic development. 
Aid-financed investment in water, power and transport strengthened the infrastructure 
base. The construction of Terbela and Mangla dams, other irrigation-related projects, 
Steel Mills and Indus Super Highway are examples of the contribution of aid. Since 
1990s, aid has helped in carrying out economic reforms. Moreover, during Afghan War 
and 2005 earthquake, non-project aid helped to overcome food shortages and balance of 
payments deficits.  
Despite some positive contributions of aid, there are some negative aspects which 
are more serious. Public sector imbalances have worsened and non-wage component of 
 
12Donor countries granted aid under different motivations. For example, Australia granted aid to 
promote economic and social progress and for political-strategic and commercial interests. Similarly, US 
granted aid for humanitarian relief and long-term economic and social development of low-income countries. 
US also provide aid to promote national security. In the context of Pakistan, US increased aid when Pakistan 
become front-line state against USSR during 1980s and after 9/11 war against terrorism.   
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recurrent expenditure is squeezing. Saving and investment rates remained low and the 
trade gap has widened. Official aid has declined their importance to rectify the economic 
conditions, while foreign investment and foreign assets of Pakistanis provide a much 
longer volume in the 1990s [Husain (1999)]. Khilji and Zampelli (1991) pointed out that 
US-aid is highly fungible and large proportion of aid has been diverted to meet defense 
expenditures. Similarly, large sums of aid were wasted in inefficient projects and controls 
over the international trade affected adversely the overall economic environment. 
Consequently, aid has become less productive and has put the country into a vicious 
circle of dependency. Inelastic revenue structure, large size of non-development 
expenditures, reduction in public investment, infrastructure deficiencies, and lack of 
social services are the main gifts of aid.  To enhance aid effectiveness there is need to 
break the vicious circle of dependency and rehabilitate the economy through prudent 
macro-management policies.   
To make aid more effective, Pakistan may rethink its macroeconomic policies, 
strengthen related institutions, improve governance and reduce corruption. At present 
economic growth in Pakistan is independent of foreign aid. For the economy, foreign aid 
is curse rather than blessing because reliance on aid further increases dependency. Hence 
further solicitation of foreign aid should be avoided and the authorities may focus on the 
encouragement of domestic investment, FDI and exports sector which are less volatile 
than foreign aid. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Foreign aid effectiveness is a very critical and unsettled issue at the theoretical and 
empirical level. Pakistan has received about US$ 73.14 billions from 1960 to 2002, but 
its social indicators still seem to be very poor. Most of the foreign aid components 
diverted from development to non-development expenditures, have produced hardly any 
significant impact on economic growth. Based on theoretical literature we specify aid-
exports-augmented neo-classical production function to examine aid-growth link. The 
model is estimated using ARDL approach to cointegration over the period 1972-2006 for 
Pakistan.  
Result suggests that foreign aid neither at aggregate nor at disaggregate level 
influenced economic growth in Pakistan. These findings confirm the earlier findings by 
Gounder (2001), Burke, et al. (2006), Movrotas (2002), Chishti and Hasan (1992), Khan 
(1997) and Ishfaq and Ahmed (2005). The finding implies that foreign aid is not a 
blessing. Further the demerits of foreign aid that include but are not limited to; harsh 
covenants from donors that times even call for compromising the autonomy of the 
Nation, corruption within the government, fiscal imprudence and poor institutions turn 
foreign aid into a curse.  Therefore, we can say that foreign aid is not a blessing but a 
curse for Pakistan. 
Other variables such as, domestic investment, foreign direct investment and 
exports exerts positive and significant impact on economic growth at the aggregate and 
disaggregate level. These results confirm the earlier findings of Husain and Jun (1992).  
The results imply that domestic investment, labour force, exports and FDI inflows have 
made an important contribution to economic growth in Pakistan.  
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The most important policy implication derived from the results is that to reduce 
dependency to foreign aid and to improve the growth prospects in the country the 
authorities may provide enabling environment for domestic investment, expand export-
oriented industries and encourage FDI inflows. Furthermore, Pakistan may focus on those 
external financing resources that are much stable, sustainable and have positive impacts 
on growth rather than depending on the volatile and unstable sources. Given the general 
characteristics of exports and FDI one can expect that these are more stable external 
resources relative to foreign aid. The two variables, i.e., exports and FDI have not only 
exerted positive impact on growth but also generate spillover effects. Hence, there is need 
to focus on these sectors.  
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